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Abstract. To suitably adapt to the challenges posed by reproduction
and survival, animals need to learn to select when to perform different
behaviours, to have internal criteria for guiding these learning processes,
and to perform behaviours efficiently once selected. To implement these
processes, their brain must be organised in a suitable hierarchical fashion.
Here we briefly review two types of neural/behavioural/computational
literatures, focussed respectively on cortex and on sub-cortical areas, and
highlight their important limitations. Then we review two computational
modelling works of the authors that exemplify the problems, brain areas,
experiments, main concepts and limitations of the two research threads.
Finally we propose a theoretical integration of the two views, showing
how this allows to solve most of the problems found by the two accounts
if taken in isolation. The overall picture that emerges is that the cortical
and the basal ganglia systems form two highly-organised hierarchical
systems working in close synergy and jointly solving all the challenges
of choice, selection, and implementation needed to acquire and express
adaptive behaviour.
1 Introduction
A distinctive feature of animal behaviour is that it supports multiple sensori-
motor activities directed to satisfy multiple survival and reproduction needs in
variable conditions. The point of departure of the analysis of this paper is that
hierarchical behaviour in animals can be considered as the result of three pivotal
classes of processes (cf. Alcock, 1998; MacFarland, 1993): (a) those leading to the
acquisition and expression of specific sensorimotor/cognitive transformations, or
skills; (b) those leading to the selection of such skills in different circumstances
depending on the needs and goals pursued by the animal; (c) and those guiding
the learning processes underlying the latter selection and the acquisition of skills
based on motivations. The implementation of these processes requires a strongly
structured brain architecture organised at multiple functional levels where the
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top ones exert control over the lower ones but at the same time are influenced by
them in their functioning (Meunier et al., 2010). This architecture is inherently
softly-modular : on one hand, it encodes in distinct neural populations different
skills, goals, and other elements that support behaviour so that they do now
interfere with each other; on the other hand, if such elements are similar they
are encoded in partially overlapping neural populations so to exploit generali-
sation. The brain architecture is also hierarchical to allow the implementation
of sensorimotor/cognitive transformations, and selection of chunks of behaviour,
at multiple levels of abstraction.
The psychological and neuroscientific literature investigating the hierarchi-
cal organisation of brain and behaviour is currently basically split in two re-
search threads having strong characterising features in terms of topics, concepts
and methods, and limited interactions. The first research thread, mainly in-
volving the sub-fields of cognitive neuroscience, primate neuro-physiology, and
neuro-psychology, focusses mainly on the study of cortical systems, runs be-
havioural/cognitive experiments with human and non-human primates, investi-
gates the non-human primate brain with neurophysiology and the human brain
on the basis of brain-imaging techniques, natural brain impairments, or tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation (e.g., Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Gazzaniga, 2004;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Walsh and Cowey, 2000). The second research
thread, mainly involving the sub-fields of bio-behavioural studies and comparative
psychology, focusses mainly on the study of sub-cortical brain structures, runs
experiments with rats and sometimes non-human primates, uses behavioural
experiments, investigates the brain based on brain lesions and sometimes phys-
iological recordings (e.g., Cardinal et al., 2002; Yin and Knowlton, 2006).
The two research treads tend to focus on two critical but distinct classes
of phenomena and concepts related to the hierarchical organisation of brain
and behaviour. This leads the two threads to produce an incomplete account
if taken in isolation. The objective of this work is to show that the integration
of the knowledge coming from the two pieces of literature solves most of those
problems, gives an better explanation of the system-level organisation of brain
and behaviour hierarchies, and offers a view that uncovers new challenges for
empirical and modelling research.
To achieve this objective we will first briefly present the view of the hierarchi-
cal organisation of brain and behaviour offered by the two research threads and
then we will highlight their limitations and those of the computational models
with which they are supported (Section 2). Second, we will further characterise
the two views on the basis of a rather detailed review of two of our computational
models, one focused on the brain hierarchy involving cortical systems (Caligiore
et al., 2010; Section 3) and one focussed on the brain hierarchy involving sub-
cortical systems (based on Mannella et al., 2010; Section 4). This review will
allow us to specify at a computational level the typical functions and mecha-
nisms implemented by the two cortical and sub-cortical systems in support of
hierarchical behaviour. Third, based on these analyses, and on other knowledge
from the neuroscientific literature, we will advance an integrated view of the
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system-level organisation of brain underlying hierarchical behaviour (Section 5;
some ideas and problems expanded here are introduced in Thill et al., 2013).
This will allow us to overcome the explanatory limitations of the two accounts
and their related models, and at the same time will furnish the basis to iden-
tify new problems that might be investigated empirically or with computational
models.
2 Two research threads on hierarchical brain and
behaviour: features and limitations
The cognitive neuroscience literature tends to explain the hierarchical organi-
sation of behaviour in terms of the underlying hierarchical organisation of cor-
tical pathways (Hamilton and Grafton, 2007; Kilner, 2011; Lestou et al., 2008;
Thill et al., 2013). For example, Fuster (2001) proposes that such organisation,
sketched in Figure 1, is formed by cortical pathways implementing sensorimotor
mappings at increasing levels of abstraction. Within it, higher levels control lower
ones by performing more integrative computations by encompassing an increas-
ing number of information sources at an increasing level of abstraction. The
literature on brain system-level organisation has further specified the compo-
nents of such hierarchy. The first sensorimotor pathway directly maps primary
sensory cortex (e.g., somatosensory cortex encoding the current state of the
musculoskeletal system) to primary motor cortex (encoding motor commands
to muscles) (Pavlides et al., 1993; Tokimura et al., 2000). A second dorsal neu-
ral pathway goes from visual cortex to associative visual/somatosensory parietal
areas (encoding affordances; Evangeliou et al., 2009; Fogassi et al., 2005), and
then to premotor cortex (encoding action plans; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Rizzolatti et al., 1996) that exerts control on primary motor cortex. This neural
pathway is in turn formed by multiple streams (Jeannerod, 1999) controlling
different actuators, in particular the arm (e.g., for reaching), the hand (e.g., for
grasping), and the eye. A third ventral neural pathway goes from visual cortex to
temporal visual areas (encoding information on relevant aspects of world, such
as the identity of objects), and then to prefrontal cortex (integrating various
sources of information to form the agent’s goals) and, via supplementary cortex,
again to premotor/motor cortex (Fuster, 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Thill
et al., 2013).
With respect to behaviour, this literature mainly focuses on the expression
of overt/motor behaviour (within the sensorimotor and dorsal pathways) and on
the higher-level control exerted on it by the brain executive functions (ventral
pathway). The specific functions implemented in each pathway can be described
by referring to the research addressing the different transformations. So, the
direct sensorimotor pathway supports the encoding and expression of dynamic
sensorimotor transformations based on a close loop between the somatosensory
and motor cortex (Graziano, 2011; Todorov and Jordan, 2002). In parallel, the
dorsal pathway integrates the sensory patterns collected from the external world
with the information on the musculoskeletal system to form affordances within
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the parietal cortex (e.g., “the seen object can be grasped with a precision grip”)
and then contributes to form and control motor plans at the level of premotor
cortex (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). At the high-
est level, the ventral pathway processes information on the identity/nature of
the objects in the environment (adaptively, these are relevant as they represent
resources potentially useful for the animal) based on temporal areas. This infor-
mation reaches the prefrontal cortex that suitably integrates such information
with the one on the agent’s goals and on this basis contributes to the selection of
the possible plans of actions prepared within the dorsal pathway (Fuster, 2001;
Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Wallis et al., 2001).
Fig. 1: Scketch of the the hierarchical organisation of cortex. Reprinted from
Fuster (2001) (Copyright 2001, with permission from Elsevier).
The bio-behavioural literature, instead, tends to focus on the sub-cortical hi-
erarchy of the brain. This involves the basal-ganglia system and its rostro-caudal
organisation based on multiple cortical-striatal macro-loops (Figure 2; the stria-
tum is the input stage of basal ganglia) encompassing (Redgrave et al., 2010;
Yin and Knowlton, 2006): the limbic loop (involving the ventral striatum, also
called accumbens), the associative loop (involving the striatum portion called
dorsomedial striatum in rats and caudatum in primates), and the sensorimo-
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tor loop (involving the striatum portion called dorsolateral striatum in rats and
putamen in primates). At the highest level, the hierarchy also involves the amyg-
dala complex (Mirolli et al., 2010; Pitka¨nen et al., 1997) and the hippocampal
system (Bast, 2007; Lisman and Grace, 2005; Voorn et al., 2004) as generators
of motivations and as loci of associations between objects/experiences and their
subjective “value” (biological relevance, novelty, etc.). Finally, they involve the
dopaminergic systems (substantia nigra pars compacta and ventral tegmental
area) controlling dopamine, the most important neuromodulator for the guid-
ance of learning and for the energization of behaviour (Berridge and Robinson,
1998).
With respect to behaviour, this literature has a strong focus not only on its
expression but also on the learning processes that lead to its acquisition, in par-
ticular within the context of the numerous classical and instrumental learning
paradigms (Cardinal et al., 2002), and on the role that value and motivations
play in these processes (e.g., supported by dopamine). Overall, the hierarchy con-
tributes to generate behaviour based on the following principles. At the highest
levels, some sub-cortical structures (e.g., the amygdala) interface the brain with
the body homeostatic regulations, and on this basis allow the assignment of value
to environmental stimuli and experiences. This allows the highest levels of the
cortico-basal ganglia systems communicating with such structures, the limbic
cortico-striatal loop, to suitably direct behaviour based on the activation of spe-
cific high-level goals (goal-directed behaviour) (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
The limbic cortico-striatal loop is also an important regulator of dopamine (via
its connections to dopaminergic areas), which in turn guides the learning pro-
cesses leading to the acquisition of behaviour (Grace et al., 2007). The goals
selected within the limbic loop then influence the selections involving attention,
affordances and sensory processing taking place within the associative loop, on
the basis of a number of “cross-loop” mechanisms (e.g., thalamo-cortical connec-
tions and “dopamine spirals”, (Haber, 2003a,a). Based on similar mechanisms,
the associative loop in turn influences the selections of the lower-level processes
taking place within the sensorimotor loop.
In part forcing the distinction for the sake of clarity, it appears that the
two research threads tend to study the respective brain structures and processes
quite in isolation from each other. Indeed, they often present an account of the
functioning of hierarchical brain almost as if the studied cortical or sub-cortical
systems taken alone were not only necessary but also sufficient for the acquisition
and expression of the investigated behaviour. This is problematic as the cortical
and sub-cortical brain components play partially overlapping but also distinct
functions. In this respect, such accounts have important limitations with respect
to the three classes of processes supporting hierarchical behaviour illustrated at
the beginning of the chapter, namely the implementation of sensorimotor trans-
formations, their selection, and the guidance of the learning processes leading to
the acquisition of such transformations.
These limitations, summarised in Table 1, are now illustrated. In this de-
scription we distinguish between the empirical and the computational literatures
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Fig. 2: The parallel basal ganglia-cortical loops forming the subcortical hierar-
chy. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Review
Neuroscience, Redgrave et al. (2010), copyright 2010.
supporting each view as the two do not always coincide. The empirical literature
focussing on the cortical hierarchy (e.g., cognitive neuroscience) investigates to a
large extent the sensorimotor-mappings of the dorsal pathways affording and im-
plementing actions, and their control by the ventral-pathway/prefrontal cortex,
but rarely tackles the issue of the specific mechanisms that the brain used to se-
lect alternative affordances and actions (e.g., Munakata et al., 2011). Moreover,
when it investigates the phenomena related to the ventral/prefrontal control of
behaviour, it faces the problem of how higher-level goals bias top-down selections
(e.g., Miller and Cohen, 2001) but it usually neglects the motivational aspects
leading to the ultimate formation and selection of goals, and to the guidance of
the learning mechanisms leading to the acquisition of the selection capabilities
at all levels (perception, action, goals, etc.).
The computational literature focussed on the cortical hierarchy develops
models giving detailed accounts of the dorsal/ventral cortical pathways (e.g.,
Fagg and Arbib, 1998; Oztop and Arbib, 2002; see also the example in Sec-
tion 3) but generally neglects the motivational processes at the origin of the
overall guidance of behaviour selection and learning processes. On the other
side, those same models often incorporate selection mechanisms based on lateral
competition (e.g., Cisek, 2007; Erlhagen and Schoner, 2002), probably because
computational implementations make evident the need of having some type of
selection mechanism.
The empirical literature (e.g., bio-behavioural neuroscience) focussing on the
sub-cortical hierarchy gives a prominent importance to the study of the selec-
tion mechanisms, of the learning mechanisms, and of the motivational processes
driving them (Cardinal et al., 2002, for a review). However, such literature tends
to give accounts of hierarchical behaviour assuming the existence of already ac-
quired whole actions (e.g., “pressing a lever”) readily available to be selected
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Literature focussing on Literature focussing on
cortical hierarchy sub-cortical hierarchy
Moti- Selection Sensorimotor Moti- Selection Sensorimotor
vation mapping vation mapping
Empirical v X V V V X
research
Computational X v V v V X
modelling
Table 1: Summary of limitations of the different literatures studying the hier-
archical organisation of brain at the cortical and sub-cortical level. “V” and
“X” respectively indicate that the literature respectively accounts or not for the
classes of issues indicated at the top of the column (“Motivation”, “Selection”,
”Sensorimotor mapping”). “v” indicates a minor account of them.
or associated with stimuli (e.g., based on S-R associations). This is a limita-
tion as, although several Pavlovian actions are indeed innately encoded in brain,
the same is not true for most instrumental actions: in this case the sensorimo-
tor mappings implementing the actions are acquired with progressive learning
processes.
The computational literature on the sub-cortical hierarchy relies upon one
of the most successful examples of synergies between empirical and computa-
tional research, namely the one based on reinforcement learning models (Barto
et al., 1983; Houk et al., 1995; Joel et al., 2002; Sutton and Barto, 1998). These
models are focussed on the learning processes leading to acquire the capacity
to select actions by trial-and-error (Table 1), and have been also developed to
capture the hierarchical organisation of the brain (Botvinick et al., 2008; Daw
et al., 2005; Solway and Botvinick, 2012). The models have also been developed
to some extents to capture the ultimate motivational sources of learning signals
(primary rewards) and behaviour drives (e.g., Barto et al., 2004; Mirolli et al.,
2013; Venditti et al., 2009). As for the related empirical literature, however, when
used to account for empirical phenomena these models tend to represent “prim-
itive actions” at a rather high level (e.g., “moving from one place to another”)
that abstracts from the sensorimotor mappings needed to implement them (Ta-
ble 1). Other times, when they do not assume high-level primitive actions but
work on the basis of fine movements, these computational models tend to give
a view of striato-cortical loops as learning by trial-and-error to implement fine
sensorimotor/cognitive transformations that map sensations to actions. As we
shall see in Section 5, this view is in contrast to the overall anatomical organi-
sation of striato-cortical loops where cross-loop flows of information tend to be
top-down (from goals to actions) rather than bottom-up (from sensations to ac-
tions), and to the evidence that fine sensorimotor/cognitive transformations are
implemented in cortico-cortical pathways rather than in striato-cortical loops.
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3 Cortical Hierarchies
This section will present a more detailed view of the organisation of the cortical
hierarchy and its functioning and learning mechanisms by reviewing in depth a
specific computational model by the authors (Caligiore et al., 2010, 2012). This
will allow us to exemplify more in detail the nature, and also the limitations, of
the accounts of the brain hierarchy given by the views focussed on cortex.
Fig. 3: Illustration of the brain cortical hierarchy addressed by the TRoPICALS
model. The processes of action specification (represented by dark blue arrows)
begin in the visual cortex and proceed rightward across the parietal lobe: these
processes transform visual information into representations of potential actions
(affordances). Along the dorsal route, sensorimotor transformations leading to
produce different actions compete for further processing. This competition is
biased by the input from prefrontal cortical regions that collects information for
action selection (red double-line arrows). The final selected action is released
into execution and causes overt feedback through the environment (dotted blue
arrow). Note that TRoPICALS, as most of the literature it refers to, does not
take into consideration the basal ganglia, the cerebellum, and the sources of
the “payoff” illustrated in the figure. Reprinted from Cisek and Kalaska (2010)
(copyright 2010, permission from Annual Reviews).
The model departs from two principles involving two cortical pathways con-
sidered in the previous section (see Figure 3): (a) the dual route hypothesis
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(Milner and Goodale, 2008; Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982), according to which
the cortical brain responsible for visual processing is organized into the dorsal
and ventral neural pathways; (b) the role of the prefrontal cortex as a source
of top-down biasing that instructs the neural competitions between potential
alternative actions at the level of the premotor cortex (Cisek, 2007; Cisek and
Kalaska, 2010; Miller and Cohen, 2001). The two principles are now illustrated
in detail.
In the original dual route proposal (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982), the
ventral stream runs from early visual cortex areas to inferotemporal cortex and
carries information about the identity of the objects (“what” pathway). Instead,
the dorsal stream runs from visual cortex areas to the parietal cortex and pro-
cesses spatial information concerning the location of objects in the visual field
(“where” pathway). The scope of this theory was later extended (Milner and
Goodale, 2008) by proposing that the ventral stream communicates visual infor-
mation to support higher cognitive processing taking place in prefrontal cortical
regions (e.g., not only object recognition but also decision making on actions to
be executed and higher-level reasoning). In contrast, the dorsal stream trans-
fers visual information to support on-line performance of actions in downstream
motor cortex areas (e.g., not only location of objects, but also implementation
of the sensorimotor transformations needed to detect affordances and visually
guide action.
The sensory system of primates and humans provides detailed information
about the external world and on this basis the motor system can perform a large
repertoire of actions. This introduces a great potential for flexibility but also for
interference. To effectively cope with the multitude of possible actions to per-
form, the brain has acquired mechanisms that coordinate low-level sensory and
motor processes on the basis of goals, external context and internal motivations
(Fuster, 2001). The prefrontal cortex plays a key role in these processes especially
when “top-down” control based on goals (and motivations) is needed (Fuster,
2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Wallis et al., 2001). More in details, within the
ventral pathway the prefrontal cortex can use information from the outer con-
text and the agent’s needs to form high-level goals. Based on this information,
the prefrontal cortex can act on the dorsal pathway by biasing the selection of
affordances and actions. This biasing activity is based on various features of the
prefrontal cortex, including its capacity to integrate multiple sources of informa-
tion, to implement working memory, and to form complex behavioural “rules”
(Deco and Rolls, 2003).
The computational model TRoPICALS (Figure 4, Caligiore et al. (2010,
2012)) proposed to account for compatibility effects studied in cognitive psy-
chology (Ellis and Tucker, 2001)1, integrates the key features of the cortical
1 In a typical compatibility effect experiment participants are asked to produce actions
which are either in agreement (compatible) with the actions typically associated with
the objects (e.g., a precision grip with a small object) or in contrast (incompatible)
with those actions (e.g., a precision grip with a large object) in tasks where the
objects size is irrelevant. If the participants exhibit longer reaction times and higher
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hierarchical organization discussed above. More in details, TRoPICALS incor-
porates in its architecture the dorsal/ventral pathways organisation of cortical
areas (Milner and Goodale, 2008); the guidance/biasing of action selection based
on prefrontal cortex “instructions” (Miller and Cohen, 2001); and the selection of
actions within premotor cortex based on a competition between affordances and
alternatives actions under a bias from the prefrontal cortex (Cisek, 2007; Cisek
and Kalaska, 2010). The acronym “TRoPICALS” summarises these principles:
Two Route, Prefrontal Instruction, Competition of Affordances, Language Sim-
ulation (the latter principle, less relevant here, was introduced to account for
compatibility effects involving language; Barsalou, 2008).
TRoPICALS reproduces the main functions of several dorsal and ventral
cortical areas (see Figure 4 for the acronyms). The model was tested within an
embodied system formed by a simulated eye (camera) and a simulated robotic
arm/hand (see Figure 5). The input of the model is formed by three neural maps
(VC), encoding an RGB visual input, and a somatosensory map (SSC), encoding
the arm angles. The output of the model is the desired posture of the hand
encoding different grips (PMCl) or the desired posture of the arm encoding a
reach target (PMCd). Downstream VC and SSC, the model divides into two main
neural pathways: the dorsal pathway, which implements suitable sensorimotor
transformations needed to perform actions on the basis of perception, and the
ventral pathway, which allows flexible control of behaviour thanks to the biasing
effects exerted by PFC on action selection. In turn, the dorsal pathway is formed
by a stream controlling grasping and a stream controlling reaching.
With respect to function and learning, the VC performs image edge extrac-
tion based on Sobel filters (Sobel and Feldman, 1968). Based on this, within
the dorsal pathway the AIP extracts the shape of objects, and within the ven-
tral pathway the VOT categorises objects using a self-organising map (SOM;
Kohonen (2003)) (see Figure 6).
Within the dorsal pathway, the AIP-PMCl and PRR-PMCd streams (i.e., the
two dorsal neural streams transforming affordances into grasping and reaching
actions) are trained on the basis of a Hebbian learning process (Dayan and
Abbott, 2001; Hebb, 1949) that allows the system to learn to associate suitable
actions (PMCl, PMCd) to available affordances (AIP, PRR). Importantly for this
paper, the Hebbian process is based on a motor babbling of the hand/arm, and
connections are formed only when the hand/accomplish a successful grasp/reach:
this means that the system ultimately uses a trial-and-error mechanism to learn
the association that allows it to select the proper actions.
Within the ventral pathway, PFC uses a second SOM to form representations
that combine the seen objects (VOT) and the task to be accomplished (STC) to
shape the current high-level goals used to bias action selected within PMCl or
PMCd (Figure 7). The premotor regions (PMCl and PMCd) integrate affordance
information from the parietal cortex (PC) (respectively from AIP and PRR
error rates in incompatible trials than in compatible ones, one can infer that seeing
objects automatically elicits the representations of their affordances, independently
of the performance of the experimental task.
Integrating cortical and basal-ganglia hierarchies 11
Fig. 4: Architecture of the TRoPICALS model. The boxes indicate the compo-
nents of the model. The label inside each box indicates the type of information
encoded by the component, whereas the acronym at its top-left corner indi-
cates the brain anatomical area putatively corresponding to it. Light and dark
grey arrows respectively indicate connections which were hardwired and con-
nections which were updated by learning processes based on a Hebb learning
rule or a Kohonen learning rule. Acronyms: AIP: the anterior intraparietal sul-
cus; PFC: the prefrontal cortex; PMCd: premotor cortex dorsal division PMCl:
premotor cortex lateral division; PRR: parietal reach region; SSC: somatosen-
sory cortex; STC: superior temporal cortex; VC: visual cortex; VOT: ventral
occipito-temporal cortex. Reprinted with permission from Caligiore et al. (2010)
(copyright 2010, APA publisher).
12 Gianluca Baldassarre, Daniele Caligiore, Francesco Mannella
Fig. 5: The robotic set-up used to test TRoPICALS. Left: The simulated arm,
hand, and eye interacting with a simulated apple. Right: The simulated arm,
hand, and eye interacting with a simulated doll. In both panels, the line pass-
ing through the object indicates the gaze direction (eye control is hardwired),
whereas the other four lines indicate the scope of the eye visual field. Reprinted
with permission from Caligiore et al. (2010) (copyright 2010, APA publisher).
regions) and goal-based information from PFC using a dynamic neural field
(Erlhagen and Schoner, 2002). The dynamic field is then used to select actions
through neural competition taking place within premotor areas. The dynamic
nature of this competition allows to account for compatibility effects: when the
action suggested by affordances are congruent with the PFC command, reaction
times for triggering the action are faster than when they are not congruent.
Figure 8 illustrates the effect of this neural competition on the speed of the
selection of actions (actions are encoded using population codes (Pouget et al.,
2000) as desired postures of hand, within PMCl, and arm, within PMCd).
The presentation of the model highlighted the typical principles and top-
ics characterising the literature focused on cortical hierarchy, and allows us to
highlight the two limitations of the approach presented at a theoretical level
in Section 2. TRoPICALS uses dynamic neural fields (Erlhagen and Schoner,
2002) to abstract affordances and actions selection mechanisms that in brain are
mainly implemented by cortical basal ganglia loops (e.g., involving parietal and
premotor areas; Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Redgrave et al., 1999; Yin and
Knowlton, 2006). In a recent extended version of TRoPICALS (Caligiore et al.,
2012) developed to account for compatibility effects in the presence of a distrac-
tor (Ellis et al., 2007), the biasing effect of the PFC was augmented by adding
inhibitory mechanisms which, as explicitly recognised in the paper, abstract the
inhibitory effects that PFC can exert on motor cortex via the basal ganglia and
the supplementary motor cortex (Nachev et al., 2008). Moreover, the Hebbian
based reinforcement learning mechanism used by TRoPICALS to acquire senso-
rimotor mappings abstracts the role of the sub-cortical mechanisms producing
the reward signals that guide the acquisition of such selection capabilities, and
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Fig. 6: Activation of the early cortical areas of TRoPICALS. The columns of
the figure show: (a) the object name, appearance, and handgrip of the objects
used in the compatibility effect experiment; (b) the activation of the neurons
forming the visual cortex (three edge sensitive red-green-blue maps) caused by
the objects; (c) dorsal pathway: the activation of AIP encoding the shape of
objects; (d) ventral pathway: the activation of the VOT encoding the identity
of objects. AIP: anterior intraparietal cortex; VOT: ventral occipitotemporal
cortex. Reprinted with permission from Caligiore et al. (2010) (copyright 2010,
APA publisher).
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Fig. 7: The activation of the PFC caused by the different representations in VOT
(objects) and the two STCi activations representing, respectively, the ecological
condition experienced during life, when affordances and motor control capabili-
ties are acquired, and the condition experienced during the psychological exper-
iment. Notice the different representations of the various contexts and objects
within the PFC: the richness of such representations is at the basis of the po-
tential of the PFC to flexibly associate any combination of the context elements
with any action. PFC: prefrontal cortex; STCi: superior temporal cortex for
instructions; VOT: ventral occipitotemporal cortex. Reprinted with permission
from Caligiore et al. (2010) (copyright 2010, APA publisher).
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Fig. 8: The activation of the PMCl during the simulation of the compatibility
effect experiments. (a) Activation of the PMCl in an incongruent trial: the biases
from PFC (goals) and PC (affordances) cause two different clusters of neurons,
encoding two different grasping actions, to compete until the cluster caused by
the PFC suppresses the cluster caused by the PC. (b) Activation of the PMCl
in a congruent trial: the biases from the PFC and the PC overlap and cause the
formation of only one cluster of neurons. The panels depict the activation of the
PMC after 100, 300, and 1,000 ms. Notice how in the incongruent condition the
stronger top-down bias from the PFC wins. Also notice how in the congruent
condition the action cluster forms more rapidly than in the incongruent one so
producing faster reaction times (compatibility effect). Reprinted with permission
from Caligiore et al. (2010) (copyright 2010, APA publisher).
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the mechanisms within the basal ganglia implementing such learning processes
(Joel et al., 2002; Tang et al., 2007).
These assumptions are viable if one studies phenomena such as compatibility
effects, but we think that they give a limited/distorted image if one studies
the overall hierarchical organisation of the brain, as they cannot account for
a number of interesting phenomena and mechanisms whose study requires an
explicit representation of selection and learning guidance processes.
4 Basal-Ganglia Hierarchies
This section reviews another model that focusses on the sub-cortical hierarchy
of the brain and that will allow us to highlight the typical features of research
focussed on such hierarchy. The review also highlights that this account has the
opposite limitations with respect to the approach reviewed in the previous sec-
tion: it fails to account for sensorimotor/cognitive transformations. The section
first introduces the brain features captured by the model, and then explains and
discusses the model itself.
The basal ganglia are a group of sub-cortical nuclei comprehending the stria-
tum and the sub-thalamic nucleus (STN) as its main input gates, and the in-
ternal globus pallidus (GPi) and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNpr) as
its main output components (Figure 9). These structures represent fundamen-
tal functional processing unit of the vertebrate brain that repeats at multiple
functional levels and forms multiple re-entrant loops with various frontal and as-
sociative cortical areas. Different loops run in parallel and each loop starts from
a cortical area, goes through a subregion of the basal ganglia, and goes back
to the cortical area of origin via the thalamus (Alexander et al., 1986; Heimer
et al., 1982; Humphries and Prescott, 2010; Middleton and Strick, 2000a; Ro-
manelli et al., 2005). Each loop is involved in the selection of the content of the
targeted cortical areas, such as a perceptual representation, an action, or a goal
(Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Redgrave et al., 1999). This selection takes place
through a mechanisms that allows basal ganglia to dishinibit the area of the tha-
lamus, in turn in loop with the cortex, corresponding to the cortical content to
be selected (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990; Gurney et al., 2001; Mink, 1996).
There is now a wide agreement on the fact that three distinct functional
domains can be distinguished within the basal ganglia corresponding to the dor-
solateral striatum (DLS), dorsomedial striatum (DMS), and ventral striatum
(VS), the latter also called nucleus accumbens (Figure 10; Yin and Knowlton,
2006). Such domains are identifiable in rats and mice and are homologue to re-
spectively the putamen, caudatum, and nucleus accumbens in primate striatum.
These domains form distinct loops interacting with distinct portions of cortex.
These distinct loops typically play different functional roles depending on the
type of information processed within the targeted cortex, and hence are also
called limbic, associative and sensorimotor loops. The functions of the loops are
now explain more in detail.
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Fig. 9: A schema of the micro architecture of a single cortical basal ganglia loop.
White arrowheads indicate glutamatergic projections whereas black arrowheads
indicate GABAergic projections. GPe: globus pallidus, external; GPi: globus
pallidus, internal; SNpc: substantia nigra, pars compacta; STN: subthalamic
nucleus.
The cortical areas that reciprocate connections with the VS are various
sub-regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), in particular the ventro-medial, or-
bitofrontal, and dorsolateral portions, important for the processing of biologically
salient states and outcomes (Humphries and Prescott, 2010; Voorn et al., 2004;
Zahm, 2000). In general, the limbic loop is involved in the selection of final goals
(e.g. the achievement of a certain food), and means-to-end goals (e.g., opening a
door to access a lever activating a food dispenser), based on motivations. These
are important mechanisms underlying goal-directed behaviour (Cardinal et al.,
2002; Corbit et al., 2001; Yin et al., 2008). The limbic loop is also important for
reward and motivation based on dopamine regulation (Berridge and Robinson,
1998; Corbit and Balleine, 2011). For example, it plays an important role in the
interaction between instrumental and Pavlovian processes, e.g. it allows cues
previously associated with reward to energise the performance of instrumental
behaviours (Corbit and Balleine, 2011; Corbit et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001).
The cortical areas that reciprocate connections with the DMS are the tem-
poral cortex (TE; Middleton and Strick, 1996), the parietal cortex (PC), the
frontal eye-fields (FEF), and the dorsal regions of the PFC (Alexander et al.,
1986; Voorn et al., 2004; Yeterian and Pandya, 1995). The associative loop is
implicated in several high-level cognitive processes (Kimchi and Laubach, 2009),
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Fig. 10: A scheme of the three main cortico-striatal regions and their interconnec-
tions. Standard arrows indicate excitatory glutamate connections. Flat arrow-
heads indicate inhibitory GABA connections. Dot arrowheads indicate dopamin-
ergic connections (dashed arrows indicate the cross-loop ones). Reprinted with
permission from Mcmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Yin
and Knowlton (2006), copyright 2006.
in particular it is involved in the formation of high-level visual representations
(typically processed in TE; Middleton and Strick, 1996), in attention, spatial
orientation, and affordance selection (involving FEF and PC, Schrimsher et al.,
2002; Volkow et al., 2007), and in working memory tasks (involving various areas
of PFC; Levy et al., 1997; Lewis et al., 2004).
Finally, the DLS is in loop with motor cortex (MC), premotor cortex (PMC),
and supplementary motor cortex (SMC) (Romanelli et al., 2005; Tang et al.,
2007). There is clear evidence that the sensorimotor loop is associated with
the control of movement, in particular in the selection of final sensorimotor
repertoires based on the current context (Alexander et al., 1986; Haber et al.,
2000; Romanelli et al., 2005; Yin and Knowlton, 2006).
Within each of the three main loops, several discrete parallel streams run
through relatively parallel pathways. For instance, the sensorimotor loop con-
tains a somatotopic motor map that repeats at the level of striatum, globus pal-
lidus, thalamus, and cortex, in particular in these regions separate areas can be
found encoding information about arms, legs, and face (Alexander and Crutcher,
1990; Romanelli et al., 2005). Moreover, within each one of these streams there
is evidence for the existence of relatively segregated channels capable of select-
ing particular cortical restricted targets, for example encoding specific actions
(Chevalier and Deniau, 1990; Gurney et al., 2001; Mink, 1996). This idea is also
a key assumption of most models on basal ganglia (e.g., see Joel et al., 2002 for
a review). Even if no direct evidence can be given, many researchers assume that
the same structure made of separate channels is present also in the associative
and limbic loops given the uniformity of the striato-cortical micro-structure over
the entire basal ganglia.
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The three striato-cortical loops form a functional hierarchy. The decisions
about motor actions, supported by the sensorimotor loop, are at a lower level
with respect to the decisions about the part of the current context the animal
should attend and process, which relies on the associative loop. On their turn,
the latter decisions are at a lower level with respect to decisions about the
motivationally salient outcomes (the high level goals of the animal) processed
by the limbic loop.
Importantly, this functional hierarchy seems to be in line with neural data
indicating that the cortico-striatal loops are anatomically organised in a hier-
archical manner from ventral to dorsal domains. In this respect, there is evi-
dence that cortices in different cortico-striatal loops are interconnected not only
through direct projections (see previous section) but also through the thalamus
so to form a cortico-thalamo-cortical pathway from higher more abstract levels
to lower sensorimotor levels of the cortico-striatal hierarchy (Haber, 2003a).
Even more important for the top-down diffusion of “value” (i.e., biological rel-
evance of stimuli) along the hierarchy, Haber (Haber, 2003b; Haber et al., 2000)
discusses anatomical and functional evidence ascribing the control expressed by
the ventral cortico-striatal loops to a dopaminergic modulation triggered via the
so called striato-nigro-striatal spiral pathway. This pathway involves dopaminer-
gic populations in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and those in the substantia
nigra pars compacta (SNpc) forming loops that reciprocate various striatal re-
gions with a pattern moving from the ventral to the dorsomedial and dorsolateral
regions. In particular, projections from ventral compartments of the striatum
reach dopaminergic neurons (in particular within the VTA) that target ven-
tral and medial striatal regions, and projections from medial regions contact
dopaminergic neurons (in particular within the SNpc) that target medial and
lateral striatal regions. Functionally, these projections diffuse the information on
value of stimuli and goals from higher levels of cognition (limbic loop) to lower
ones (associative and sensorimotor loops).
The model proposed by Mannella et al. (2010) (see also Mannella et al.,
2011) captures the main processes illustrated above and specifies them in com-
putational terms. In particular, the model reproduces the three cortico-striatal
loops, the dopaminergic spirals, the processing of value within amygdala, and
some cortico-cortical connections (which plays the role of transferring informa-
tion between loops so to support learning, not of implementing sensorimotor
transformations).
The model reproduces instrumental devaluation effects and also their absence
demonstrated in multiple experiments where different areas of the sub-cortical
systems reviewed above are lesioned. Figure 11 shows the simulated robotic rat
used to reproduce the devaluation effects. A typical devaluation experiment is
formed by three phases (Figure 12; see Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). In the
first phase, a rat is first instrumentally trained to work on a manipulandum A
(e.g., a lever) to obtain a reward A (e.g., food pellets), and on a manipulandum
B (e.g., to pull a chain) to obtain a different reward B (e.g., a sucrose solution).
In the second phase, the rat is satiated for one food (e.g., by giving free access
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to the pellets). In the third phase, the rat is set in front of both manipulanda
for the first time, and the number of actions performed on them is recorded
in extinction (i.e., without reward delivery to avoid re-learning processes). The
results of the experiment are that the rat acts more often on the manipulandum
that corresponds to the food for which it has not been satiated. This experiment
is considered a paradigmatic demonstration that the rat behaviour in the third
phase is goal-directed as it selects the action that leads to obtain the valued
outcome (goal) without the need of re-learning. Indeed, the action is selected on
the basis of the value of the two goals (two foods) and not on the basis of the
stimuli triggering actions (e.g., the sight of the lever and the chain) as in the
case of habitual action.
Fig. 11: A snapshot of the simulator used in the study of the devaluation exper-
iment. The simulated rat is at the centre of the experimental chamber, the food
dispenser is behind the rat, the lever is at the rat’s left hand side, and the chain
is at the rat’s right hand side. Reprinted from (Mannella et al., 2010) (copyright
2010, with permission from Cambridge University Press).
The architecture of the model is shown in Figure 13 (Mannella et al., 2010).
The model is entirely formed by leaky neurons and uses localistic representations
to make its interpretation fully transparent. The model is based on two cortico-
basal ganglia loops, namely the limbic and the sensorimotor loops (the associa-
tive loop was not represented for simplicity). The selection processes performed
in the basal-ganglia cortical loops are represented with a neural competition tak-
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Fig. 12: A simplified schema of the instrumental devaluation paradigm. On the
top-left the training phase: the animal learns to use two levers to obtain two
different rewards. On the top-right the devaluation phase: the animal is satiated
of one of the two rewards. On the bottom-right the test phase: the animal is
presented with both manipulanda and actions toward each of them are measured
in absence of any reward presentation.
ing place within premotor cortex. For simplicity, the model represents only the
cortical area in loop with dorsolateral striatum (PMC in this case), whereas it
abstracts away the NAcc-PFC and the PFC-PMC connections). The model also
captures the reinforcement learning processes, guided by phasic dopamine (i.e.,
dopamine produced in strong, short-lasting bursts), that allow the two loops to
acquire their selection capabilities. Finally, and importantly, the VS (nucelus
accumbens) communicates with the the amygdala (Amg) that informs it on the
value of stimuli (e.g., the sight of a particular lever is associated with the future
appearance of a valuable food). Within Amg, the value of anticipated stimuli
(food A, food B) can be regulated by the internal states of the system (e.g., in
the model the satiation for one food inhibits the activation of its representation).
In the simulations, during the first phase of the experiment three learning
processes take place: one leading to the formation of habits, one leading to the
attribution of value to previously neutral stimuli, and one assigning value to
outcomes. The first process leads the sensorimotor loop to learn habits based on
instrumental (i.e., trial-and-error/reinforcement learning) processes that allow
the formation of associations between stimuli (the sight of the lever or of the
chain) and responses (lever pressing or chain pulling) on the basis of phasic
dopamine (produce by the ventral tegmental area). For example, the sight of a
lever is associated to the action of pressing it as this leads to receive food A that
in turn causes the production of dopamine.
The second learning process, based on differential Hebbian learning rules,
leads the Amg to acquire Pavlovian associations between stimuli (the conditioned
stimuli corresponding to the sight of the lever or of the chain) and outcomes (the
unconditioned stimuli corresponding to the two foods). For example, within Amg
the representation of the sight of a lever gets associated to the representation
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of food A as these two stimuli are observed one after the other. Once formed,
these associations allow the rat to “assign a value” to previously neutral stimuli,
for example to recall the representation of the biologically valuable food A when
the lever is seen.
The third process leads the limbic loop to associate the representations of
valuable stimuli within Amg to possible outcomes (goals) encoded within VS.
For example, the representation of food A in Amg gets associated with the rep-
resentation of the goal get food A in VS. This association takes place within the
limbic loop, and the nucleus accumbens is the nexus that links goal representa-
tions to their current value (i.e., their counterparts in Amg). “Current” because
the Amg is capable of changing the value assigned to different stimuli on the
basis of the animal current internal states, e.g. if it is hungry or satiated.
Once these associations are formed, the system can exploit them to act adap-
tively. In particular, the goals encoded and selected within the limbic loop are
associated to the actions encoded in the sensorimotor loop. These connections
rely on cortico-cortical inter-loop pathways and also on sub-cortical pathways
(dopaminergic spirals). In real animals, these associations form with learning
but for simplicity in the model they are hand-coded. Once these links have been
learned the sole activation of goal representations in VS by the Amg (e.g., be-
cause a lever related to a valuable goal is perceived) is sufficient to bias the
selection of the action that leads to accomplish the selected goal.
Figure 14 shows how the model reproduces the devaluation effect. The figure
reports the number of lever presses in rats with intact Amg (intact, or “sham”,
rats) and in rats where Amg has been lesioned (“BLA-lesioned” rats: the ba-
solateral amygdala – BLA – is an important part of Amg). The figure shows
that sham rats tend to press the lever more frequently when food B (previously
instrumentally associated with the chain) is devalued than when food A (pre-
viously associated with the lever) is devalued. The causes of this behaviour are
as follows. During the training phase, the rat acquires two habits within the
sensorimotor loop, one that leads it to press the lever when it sees the lever, and
one that leads it to pull the chain when it sees the chain. After the devaluation
of one food, the rat is tested by setting it in front of both the lever and the
chain at the same time. In this case both habits are triggered and try to recall
the action related to them (pressing the lever and, at the same time, pulling the
chain). If the Amg is intact, the sight of the lever and the chain recall the food A
and food B representations within it. However, only one of these representations
can actually manifest as the other is inhibited by the satiation internal state
(say for food B). Such active representation (say for food A) can so activate the
units of VS corresponding to the food A outcome and then, via the connections
to cortex, to bias the selection of one action (e.g., pressing the lever). Instead,
when Amg is lesioned then VS cannot preferentially select one outcome and so
unbalance the selection for one or the other available actions. As a result the rat
will select the two actions with a similar frequency.
This model highlights the typical features, and the limitations, of the research
that focusses on the sub-cortical hierarchy of brain. First, the model emphasises
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Fig. 13: The architecture of the model used to investigate the devaluation effect.
Reprinted from (Mannella et al., 2010) (copyright 2010, with permission from
Cambridge University Press).
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Fig. 14: Behaviour of the simulated rats in the devaluation experiment. The
histogram bars show the average and standard deviation of actions performed by
Sham and BLA-lesioned rats on the lever (previously instrumentally associated
with food A) when either food A or food B have been devalued. Reprinted
from (Mannella et al., 2010) (copyright 2010, with permission from Cambridge
University Press).
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the trial-and-error learning processes taking place within each cortico-striatal
loop, and its fundamental role for the acquisition of their capacity to select the
cortical contents. Second, such learning processes are guided by the value sys-
tems, such as the amygdala and the dopaminergic system, that lead the animal
to learn to select actions and goals that are valuable for survival and reproduc-
tion (e.g., to acquire food). Third, the model captures the hierarchy existing
between the different cortico-striatal loops: importantly for this review, the hi-
erarchy captures in particular the flow of control from the higher “limbic” levels,
informed on the actual needs of the animal, to the lower sensorimotor levels
(notice how this contrasts with reinforcement learning models that use trial-
and-error processes to mainly implement sensorimotor transformations linking
the sensations from the outer world to the actions to perform).
Aside these strengths, the model has also some important limitations with
respect to the explanation of brain hierarchy. The most important ones are
that actions (e.g. “pressing a lever” or “pulling a chain”) are considered as
ready-available wholes that the sensorimotor loop can select in correspondence
to stimuli, affordances are abstracted away, and goals are assumed to be al-
ready formed and ready to be selected by the limbic loop. This means that the
model does not account for the processes involving the sensorimotor/cognitive
transformations happening at different levels of abstraction and accounted for
by the literature focussing on the cortical hierarchy of brain, e.g. considered in
the model reviewed in the previous section.
5 Integrating the cortical and sub-cortical hierarchies
Based on the reviews and the models presented in the previous sections, we can
now propose an integrated view of the cortical and sub-cortical hierarchies of
brain. This is summarised in Figure 15. We first present this view by focussing
on the role of cortex and basal ganglia in the hierarchy, then we illustrate some
detailed aspects of the different functioning mechanisms of the two, and finally
we highlight important system-level open problems highlighted by the view.
The general idea is that cortex implements sensorimotor/cognitive transfor-
mations needed to perform and control action at different levels of abstraction.
The sensorimotor neural pathway (SSC-MC) implements the dynamic mapping
closely linking the proprioception to the control of muscles. The dorsal neural
pathway (PPC-PMC-MC) encodes affordances (PPC) and possible motor plans
(PMC) to be executed downstream (MC). The ventral neural pathway (ITC-
dlPFC) detects the resources available in the environment (ITC) and, based on
this information and higher level information from areas encoding value (OFC,
vmPFC), biases the selection of motor plans (SMC-PMC; note that there are
also important connections from PFC to PC, not reported here for simplicity,
that allow PFC to contribute to select affordances within PC). Overall, the var-
ious pathways perform different mappings from sensation to action taking place
at increasing levels of abstraction: from proprioception to muscles (SSC–MC);
from visual information needed to interact with objects to motor plans (VC–
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PPC–PMC–MC); from visual information on the nature of objects to high level
goals (VC–ITC–dlPFC–SMC–PMC); from visceral states to biologically charged
goals (Amg/Hip/Hyp–OFC/vmPFC–dlPFC).
Each loop of the basal ganglia collects a rich set of information from various
areas of cortex and on this basis selects the contents processed in specific target
cortical areas. These selection processes involve the whole cortex with the excep-
tion of primary cortical areas, and have an increasing importance (e.g., in terms
of neural resources involved) going towards the higher levels of the hierarchy. So,
at the highest level of the hierarchy the VS, supplied with rich information on
value of stimuli by various sub-cortical areas (e.g., Amg, Hip, Hyp), contributes
to select biologically relevant goals encoded in OFC/vmPFC (e.g., in relation to
the achievement of a particular food). At a lower level, the DMS contributes to
selects more abstract goals (e.g., pressing a lever) encoded in dlPFC, affordances
encoded in PPC, and object identity encoded in ITC. At the lowest level, the
DLS selects motor plans, encoded in PMC, and action implementation processes,
encoded in MC. The hierarchy formed by basal ganglia also involve “inter-loop”
mechanisms, such as the dopaminergic spirals (VTA, SNpc), that carry informa-
tion on value, and cortico-thalamo-cortical connnections, not represented in the
figure.
The integrated view we just proposed, that assigns to cortex a special role in
performing sensorimotor/cognitive transformations and to basal ganglia a special
role in performing selection, in particular on the basis of value, is supported
by four general system-level features of the two systems. Some aspects of these
features are represented in Figure 16. The first feature involves the input/output
ratio of each element of the two systems (e.g., PMC or DLS). This ratio is
very high in basal ganglia with respect to cortex. Striatal neurons have a very
large input from various cortical areas, whereas their output is focussed and
concentrated on one specific cortical area with which it forms a loop (Redgrave
et al., 1999; Wilson, 1995) . This makes this funnel-like architecture of basal
ganglia ideally suited to perform the selection of whole neural assemblies at the
level of the targeted cortex. Instead, cortical areas usually reciprocate a similar
amount of connections to the areas from which they receive an input (Felleman
and Van Essen, 1991). This architecture is ideal to perform complex mappings
through which detailed information (e.g. on perception) is transformed into other
detailed information (e.g., on motor commands).
A second important feature is the realm of activity of the two systems. Cor-
tex covers all aspect of cognition, from primary sensory processing to primary
motor processing, from associative processing to the processing needed to imple-
ment executive functions. Instead, basal ganglia play an increasingly important
role, measurable in terms of neural resources involved, going from sensory input
to motor output, and from lower to higher levels of “cognition” (Alexander and
Crutcher, 1990). Thus, basal ganglia do not project to primary sensory corti-
cal areas, involved with sensory low-level cognition processes (Romanelli et al.,
2005); the basal ganglia regions involving DMS have some projections to sensory
associative areas (PC, IT); those involving DLS have important projections to
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Fig. 15: An integrated view of the cortical and basal ganglia systems. Acronyms:
Amg: amygdala; BG: basal ganglia; DA: dopamine; DLS: dorsolateral striatum;
DMS: dorsomedial striatum; Hip: hippocampus; Hyp: hypothalamus; dlPFC:
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ITC: inferotemporal cortex; MC: motor cortex;
OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; PMC: premotor cortex; PPC: posterior parietal cor-
tex; SMC: somatosensory cortex; SNpc: substantia nigra, pars compacta; SSC:
somatosensory cortex; VC: visual cortex; vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex; VTA: ventral tegmental area.
the frontal cortex area where the brain processes action preparation and execu-
tion (PMC, MC); finally those involving DMS and VS have a major target in
cortical areas implementing processes related to high-level executive functions
(respectively dlPFC and OFC/vmPFC). These patterns allow cortex to perform
detailed computations at all levels of cognition, while assign to basal ganglia a
special role in selecting information at high levels of cognition and close to action
preparation and performance.
A third feature is that the highest levels of the basal ganglia hierarchy (in-
volving VS) are also more strongly linked to the sub-cortical areas processing
value (e.g., Amg and Hip) with respect to the highest levels of the cortical hi-
erarchy (PFC) (Graybiel and Kimura, 1995). The ventral basal ganglia are also
more strongly involved in the regulation, and as targets, of dopamine than the
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related cortical areas (Abercrombie et al., 1989; Berridge and Robinson, 1998).
These features pose basal ganglia in an ideal position to be informed about the
subjective relevance of stimuli, i.e. value, so to perform at best the selection
processes.
The last feature involves the learning processes usually ascribed to the two
systems. Cortex is usually seen as the locus of unsupervised or associative learn-
ing (Doya, 2000), as also indicated by the long term potentiation (LTP) processes
happening in it (Iriki et al., 1989; Kirkwood et al., 1996). Basal ganglia, instead,
have a micro-architecture that makes it ideal for selection (Redgrave et al., 1999)
and for trial-and-error learning guided by dopamine learning signals (Joel et al.,
2002).
We close this section by showing a last aspect of the integrated system-
level framework, in particular how it might aid the identification of the local
micro interactions of the cortical and basal-ganglia systems where they physically
contact. This is illustrated on the basis of Figure 16. The cortical pathways
implement detailed and focussed sensorimotor/cognitive transformations that
progressively transform signals from sensory to motor areas (Cisek and Kalaska,
2010; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Instead, basal ganglia collect a wide range of
information, including important information on value (Graybiel and Kimura,
1995), and then perform a targeted selection of spatially limited, cortical contents
based on focussed output channels involving the striatum-pallidal dishinibition
mechanism (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990). This dishinibition mechanism acts on
the cortico-thalamic loops by freeing it from the tonic inhibition of GPi/SNpr
so as to let the information flow of the sensorimotor/cognitive transformations
passing through the targeted cortical pathway stage to pass without interruption
(Mink, 1996). In particular, information that travels through the various stages
of cortex is amplified/refined/preserved by the close loops of such stages with
thalamus. These cortico-thalamic loops are by default interrupted (at the level
of thalamus) by tonic inhibitory inputs from basal-ganglia outputs. When basal-
ganglia release from such inhibition specific cortico-thalamic loops, information
is free to be elaborated and flow through the corresponding cortical area. The
overall idea is thus that information travels from cortical sensory areas to motor
cortical areas via different sensorimotor/cognitive transformation pathways: each
of these is formed by various cortical stages within which the various specific
contents, part of the information flow, can be either stopped or allowed to be
elaborated and pass by the specific channels of the basal-ganglia loops targeting
them.
6 Conclusions
The hierarchical organisation of behaviour requires the implementation of three
key functions by the underlying brain hierarchy, namely the implementation
of sensorimotor/cognitive transformations at multiple levels of abstraction, the
selection of various elements of such transformations, and the guidance of the
learning processes. Based on this conceptual grid, the article showed how current
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Fig. 16: Mechanisms of interaction involving cortex and basal ganglia (BG). The
interactions are explained in the graph with a focus on the BG-cortical loop
involving DLS and PMC. With respect to cortex, notice how: (a) PMC is part
of a bottom-up information flow involving the VC-PPC-PMC cortical pathway;
(b) PMC activity is modulated by a top-down information flow involving the
SMC-PMC cortical pathway; (c) the VC-PPC-PMC-MC input-output pathway
is “intercepted”, at the level of PMC, by a cortico-basal ganglia loop involving
DLS and supporting the selections happening within the PMC itself. With re-
spect to basal ganglia: (a) DLS forms a loop with the target PMC cortical region;
(b) DLS also receives information from all cortical areas that are linked to PMC
(and from other cortical areas not reported here): the ample information gath-
ered through these connections allows DLS to perform a well-informed selection
of PMC contents. The graph also schematically illustrate the neural processes
happening within and between DLS and PMC: (a) the cortical cell assemblies
have comparable size (e.g., those of PPC and PMC in the graph) and exchange
all-to-all connections (e.g., the PPC-PMC ones): this allows cortical pathways to
perform fine mappings at all levels of cognition; (b) BG receive all-to-all afferent
connections from cortex, but exchange connections organised in separate chan-
nels with the target cortex (DLS-PMC connections); (c) the BG cell assemblies
are much smaller than those of cortex, so implementing a notable funnelling of
cortical-to-BG information, and an “abstract control” of BG over the targeted
cortex. See Figure 15 for the acronyms.
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research on the hierarchical organisation of brain is either focussed on the study
of cortical hierarchies, or on the study of sub-cortical hierarchies formed by basal
ganglia and other sub-cortical components processing value and motivations.
When taken in isolation, these two approaches have important limitations in
accounting for brain hierarchy. In particular, they either tend to ascribe to the
systems they study all the three processes needed by the hierarchical organisation
of behaviour, or they overlook some of those processes altogether. Thus, the
cortical account often fails to specify the selection mechanisms needed to direct
the course of action, and in large part the motivational mechanisms guiding
learning processes. On the other side, in most cases the sub-cortical account fails
to explain how the detailed sensorimotor and cognitive input-output mappings
are learned and expressed.
The type of accounts of the hierarchical organisation of brain given by the two
literature threads have been exemplified here through the presentation of two
models, focussed respectively on the hierarchical processes implemented by the
cortex and on the processes implemented by basal ganglia and amygdala. The
two models made apparent how the two approaches mainly focus on, respectively,
the explanation of sensorimotor/cognitive transformations happening at different
levels of abstraction and on the explanation of selection based on value. The two
models also highlighted that the computational approaches that back up the
cortical and sub-cortical empirical study of brain hierarchy are affected by the
same limitations and biases of the related empirical literatures.
Given these limitations, this paper has proposed a system-level framework
on hierarchical brain within which the cortical and sub-cortical systems form a
whole integrated hierarchical system and play complementary distinct roles. The
principle of this integrated view can be summarised as follows:
– Cortex is formed by multiple sensorimotor and cognitive pathways that per-
form fine and detailed information elaborations and transformations from
sensations to actions. The capability to perform the elaborations and trans-
formations is acquired mainly through unsupervised and associative learning
mechanisms. The major pathways are: (a) a somatosensory-motor pathway
to implement learning and performance of motor skills (this mainly involves
somatosensory and motor cortex); (b) a dorsal pathway to build affordances
and to prepare actions (this mainly involves parietal and premotor cortex).
(c) a ventral pathway to identify the resources in the environment and to
implement the highest level cognitive processes such as the executive con-
trol of goals encoded at multiple levels of abstraction (this mainly involves
temporal and prefrontal cortex).
– Basal-ganglia form multiple loops with cortex and select information at mul-
tiple levels of abstraction. The ability to perform such selections is acquired
on the basis of trial-and-error learning processes. The major basal-ganglia
cortical loops are: (a) a sensorimotor loop, important for selecting motor
acts (this involves dorsolateral portions of the basal ganglia, and motor cor-
tex); (b) an associative loop, important to select perceptual and high-level
cognition contents (this involves medial portions of basal ganglia, and tem-
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poral, parietal, and prefrontal cortex); (c) a limbic loop, important for se-
lecting goals and contents with high biological valence, and to regulate the
dopamine system (this involves ventral portions of basal ganglia, and orbital
and medial prefrontal portions of cortex).
– The highest cortical levels and the ventral basal-ganglia levels have a strong
interaction with limbic sub-systems of brain, and so are informed on the
motivational and biological value of stimuli, events, and experiences (this
involves sub-systems such as amygdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and
the dopaminergic centres). This information drives and guides the learning
processes happening in cortical and basal ganglia systems.
– Information flows and is finely elaborated within the cortical pathways, and
within the various stages of such pathways, especially close to the output
and at high-levels of cognition, basal ganglia select them by inhibiting or
letting them pass through.
The integrated framework proposed here leads to overcome the limitations
of the cortical and sub-cortical accounts of hierarchical brain when taken in
isolation. Indeed, within the framework the limitations of the cortical theories
related to the selection and learning guidance functions are overcome by the
fact that such functions are mainly implemented by the sub-cortical systems. On
the other side, the limitation of the sub-cortical theories related to the lack of
explanation of the fine sensorimotor and cognitive transformations are overcome
by the implementation of such function by cortical pathways.
Aside these strengths, the hypothesis has still some open problems. We men-
tion few of these. As explained in Section 2, cortical systems are usually as-
sumed to implement two forms of learning, namely unsupervised learning (es-
pecially within the perceptual areas) and associative learning (especially within
the frontal areas). This raises a problem for the view proposed here when actions
or other chunks of knowledge have to be acquired by the cortex on the basis of
trial-and-error processes. The framework proposed here offers a solution to this
problem. The solution is based on the intriguing idea that, at least when learning
happens above a certain level of abstraction, basal-ganglia can acquire the map-
pings by trial-and-error, and then the information so acquired is progressively
transferred to the cortex, which learns on the basis of associative processes un-
der the “instruction” (supervision) by basal ganglia. There is indeed empirical
evidence (Carelli et al., 1997; Tang et al., 2007) that when behaviour is first
acquired and then automatized (i.e., it becomes “habitual”) the basal ganglia
show a high initial activation that then decreases with the progress of learning
(see also Ashby et al., 2010, for a review and Ashby et al., 2007, for a model).
This hypothesis, however, needs to be further investigated in future work.
The second problem is a specification of the previous one when it is applied to
the cortical acquisition of fine and detailed somatosensory-motor cortical trans-
formations (e.g., the mapping implementing a skill). In this case, the mechanism
proposed above cannot be exploited because, as shown in Figure 16, basal gan-
glia can select cortical neural assemblies only at a gross level given their reduced
number of neurons with respect those of the targeted cortical areas. So, how
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can such mappings be acquired? This is a problem left open by the framework
presented here, and leading us to touch an issue that can be only introduced
here and that should be tackled in future work. A possible solution to the prob-
lem might rely upon the cerebellum. Cerebellum, hosting more than half of the
neurons of brain, plays a critical role in the acquisition and expression of motor
behaviour (Houk and Wise, 1995; Kawato, 1999). The problem mentioned above
could be solved by a close interplay between the cortical somatosensory loop
and cerebellum. A possible idea to explore would be that cerebellum aids the
cortex to acquire fine sensorimotor mappings based on the supervised learning
processes that it implements (Doya, 2000; Rolls and Treves, 1998). In line with
this, some authors propose that the cerebellum plays a key role during learning
but then progressively passes the acquired information to cortex (see Hua and
Houk, 1997, for a review and a model). We think that the overall motor hierar-
chy involving the cerebellum would see the basal ganglia, cortex, and cerebellum
playing their major roles respectively at the top, middle, and lower levels of the
hierarchy, so we partially disagree with this view. However, we recognise that it
represents a solution to the problem we are considering. This issues need further
considerations in the future and to be reconciled within the framework proposed
here.
The latter observation leads naturally to highlight a further limitation of the
framework proposed here, namely the need to integrate cerebellum within it.
Indeed, aside the sheer computational importance that cerebellum has within
the nervous systems, there are strong indications that it forms important loops
with cortex similarly to basal ganglia (Middleton and Strick, 2000b). Moreover,
cerebellum plays important functions not only for motor behaviour but also
for cognitive processes (Ito, 2008). These aspects should be accounted for by a
system-level framework of brain hierarchy like the one presented here, a further
issue to be investigated in future work.
Although we recognise the existence of these and other open issues, we think
that the system-level framework presented here offers a better understanding
of how the brain actually implements the three key functions critical for the
hierarchical organisation of behaviour – sensorimotor/cognitive transformations,
selection, and learning guidance – than the cortical and sub-cortical theories of
it. In this respect, the framework is an important theoretical tool usable to
formulate new specific theories, to make new predictions and to design new
experiments to test them, and to design new computational models on brain
hierarchy.
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